

poder comprenderla, si bien permite entrever en tan poca extensión las virtudes y el alcance de la tesis que defiende. Esto se debe, quizás, a la correcta elección de estructura y al uso de un lenguaje accesible lleno de ejemplos y analogías bien escogidos.

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LÓPEZ-ORELLANA, Rodrigo; SUÁREZ-RUIZ, Joaquín. *Filosofía posdarwiniana. Enfoques actuales sobre la intersección entre análisis epistemológico y naturalismo filosófico*, Milton Keynes: College Publications, 2021, 469 pp., ISBN 967-1-84890-379-1

The book *Filosofía posdarwiniana. Enfoques actuales sobre la intersección entre análisis epistemológico y naturalismo filosófico* [*Posdarwinian Philosophy. Current Perspectives on the Intersection of Epistemological Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism*] could first and foremost be described as a collection of specialized articles on topics that relate philosophy to biology and *vice versa*. As the editors describe it, the concept of posdarwinian philosophy denotes a complementary relationship expressed by, on the one hand, the epistemological analysis of biology and, on the other, the integration of biological concepts and hypotheses into philosophical investigation. More specifically, the perspective here followed by the authors adopts Charles Darwin's theory of biological evolution when posing philosophical questions –and elaborating their corresponding answers– about the human being and its relations to other species, society, and the environment in general.

The book has a preface of the editors, a prologue written by the Spanish philosopher of biology Antonio Diéguez –which also contributes to the book with a chapter of his own– and eighteen chapters written mainly by Spanish-speaking specialists, but not only, since it accounts with collaborations by Michael Ruse, David Livingstone Smith, Laurence Kaufmann, and Fabrice Clément. In the case of these English and French-speaking scholars, the chapters are presented in their original language along with a translation into Spanish. The issue of the language in which the book has been published is not of minor importance since, as the editors point out, the inclusion of the evolutionist perspective in philosophical investigation is not popular among Spanish-speaking academic circles. For this reason only *Posdarwinian philosophy* might very well be worth a read. But that is not the case: there are plenty of other reasons why philosophers and biologists together could benefit from it. One of them would be the obvious interdisciplinary point of view of the authors,

which undoubtedly adds richness to their investigations and facilitates the integration of their results into applied research. Other relevant reasons would be the potential answers the reader could find to current and highly debated topics that are of interest not only to scholars but to the public in general and, in connection to this, the authors' commitment to making philosophy easy for everyone to understand, hence their effort to transmit their thoughts through a truly clear writing style.

With all this being said, I would like to describe the structure of the book to draw a more specific but still general picture of its contents for its potential and future readers. As I have already mentioned at the beginning of the previous paragraph, *Posdarwinian Philosophy* opens with an expected preface of the editors and a prologue, followed by eighteen chapters which are divided into three sections. The first section is entitled *Entre precursores y cambios de paradigma* [*Between Precursors and Paradigm Shifts*], so one could expect a historical reconstruction of what has happened in the history of science that led us to where we are today. And that is exactly what the opening chapter of the book, written by Michael Ruse, invites the reader to do when describing the trajectory followed by the theory of evolution and its place in the history of western thought. Of course, the author aims to show –just as the title of the chapter highlights– why *The Descent of Man* should be regarded as the most important work in moral philosophy after Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. Due to the strongly modern point of view of what the proposal of the book seems to be when reading the preface and prologue, it comes as a pleasant surprise to find mentions of ancient philosophers right at its opening. In this line of thought the third chapter of the book, entitled *Darwin filósofo* [*Darwin, a philosopher*], follows John Dewey's account in which Darwin's *The Origin of Species* is regarded as a turning point in the history of western thought. The author of the chapter, Rodrigo Ginnobili, then aims to expand Dewey's hypothesis using seven key concepts –essence, design, harmony, individuality, necessity, perfection, and wisdom– as examples to contrast a so-called platonic-aristotelian vision of the world with a new one originated by Darwin's theory of evolution. Even though the author excuses himself at the beginning of his chapter by warning the reader that he may have to sacrifice precision to prove his point, that doesn't justify several oversimplifications and misconceptions about ancient philosophy that can be found throughout his contribution and can also be expected due to the lack of bibliography in it on ancient thinkers. Still, Ginnobili's chapter on Darwin as a philosopher becomes an interesting read when compared to Esposito's, who tries to make the same point with the exact opposite strategy. Maurizio Esposito's contribution, the fifth of the book, succeeds in integrating Darwin into the history of philosophy by opposing Dewey's interpretation of *The origins of species*. Esposito argues that there

has never been a ‘Darwinian revolution’, but that the real novelty of Darwin’s proposal lies in the successful confluence of two philosophical traditions: materialism and historicism, the first of which can already be found in many ancient philosophers.

The second section of the book, named *El difuso límite entre análisis epistemológico y naturalismo filosófico* [*The dim limit between epistemological analysis and philosophical naturalism*], leaves behind its main historical concerns to move onto epistemological considerations on the inclusion of biological knowledge in philosophical research. It opens with a contribution by Laurence Kaufmann and Fabrice Clément, who argue in favor of including naturalism in social sciences, that is, they defend a moderate social naturalism which in their words “holds autonomy for social facts and at the same time gives them a place in the natural world» (p. 222). The authors trace behaviors that are common to non-human and human primates alike and through the key concept of *social affordance* they try to show that there is also a normative dimension in what would commonly be called ‘the natural world’. This fact, along with the existence of a *social grammar* among non-human primates, and a non-mentalist conception of social cognition, suggests that the distinction between nature and society –and consequently between humans and other animals– may not be as current as one would expect. Nonetheless, Kaufmann and Clément recognize that there is a trait that differentiates humans from other species: imagination. To them, this faculty allows humans to overcome the limitations of their group and to widen their conception of what –or rather, who– a fellow man is, giving rise to several –probably desirable– political and moral consequences.

In a relatively similar line of thought, Alfredo Marcos deals with *the biological and cultural bases of human creativity* –which is the title of his chapter–. He argues that creativity consists of “a process of actualization by differentiation» (p. 276), just as the process of genesis of a living being proceeds also by differentiation, from homogeneity to heterogeneity. And this is not for him a matter of casual comparison, but rather a continuity that goes from a natural phase to a ‘free phase’, both based on a substantialist and pluralist ontology that seems to also defend a moderate naturalist view of the human being.

The last chapter of this second section of the book that I will attempt to summarize is entitled *La Antropología Filosófica frente al factum de la evolución* [*Philosophical Anthropology in the face of the factum of evolution*]. In it, Rodrigo Braicovich maintains that there are reasons to try to keep the dialogue between philosophical and biological anthropology alive, despite the several crises in the theoretical frameworks on which that dialogue was supposed to stand. On one hand, the author argues that such crises were caused by an anthropocentric view of biology, on the other, that the theory of evolution has

much to offer to the analysis of anthropological philosophy. What I find the most enriching in Braicovich's proposal is that the inclusion of evolutionist biology in philosophical anthropology does not leave the latter without a subject matter. Since the theory of evolution still recognizes an anthropological difference between humans and other animals without the need to posit a hierarchy between the species, anthropological studies can thanks to it become a wider, more interdisciplinary, and more complex field of research.

The third and last section of the book, *De la filosofía de las ciencias cognitivas al giro cognitivo en la filosofía* [*From philosophy of cognitive sciences to the cognitive turn in philosophy*], focuses on one of the most current trends of philosophical naturalism: the introduction in philosophical analysis of knowledge from disciplines such as experimental psychology, neurosciences, and other cognitive sciences. This section opens with a chapter by Anna Estany entitled *La cognición extendida y colaborativa: un reto para la epistemología* [*Extended and collaborative cognition: a challenge for epistemology*]. To her mind, even though the trend of collaborative scientific research might cause a few challenges—such as how to evaluate the quality of a paper that is the product of multidisciplinary investigation—, we humans have the necessary tools to meet them. She defends this conclusion by referring to models of situated and extended cognition that support the thesis that the unity of cognition does not necessarily equal the brain and can extend to, for example, the limits of a research group. Finally, the book closes with Natalia Zavadiivker's *El reduccionismo instrumentalista de la racionalidad ecológica aplicada a las decisiones morales* [*The instrumentalist reductionism of ecological rationality applied to moral decisions*] where she criticizes Gerd Gigerenzer's theory of limited rationality for its purely instrumental view of morality. At the same time, she explores the fact that from an evolutionist point of view of metaethics even the principles and values that are understood as ends can be viewed as ideal means or strategies to deal with adaptative challenges, that is, as just another subclass of biological adaptation.

In sum, *Posdarwinian Philosophy* is a specific, rigorous, and stimulating piece of work to keep scholars interested and willing to discuss; and it's still informative and contemporary enough to become accessible for non-specialists who are in search of well-founded and clearly expounded scientific investigation.

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