In defense of comprehensive epistemic conservatism
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.24310/crf.16.1.2024.14175Keywords:
epistemic conservatism, rationality, evidence, justificationAbstract
The aim of this paper is to present an epistemic conservatism form that is comprehensive, and holding that: from that S believes p, as a successful response to their environment, p acquires a favorable epistemic status for which it is rational that the belief is maintained until overcoming evidences appear that are alternative and incompatible with p. In addition, it will investigate possible developments that can make the integral version a promising and at the same time plausible principle, to conclude that it gives rationality to our doxastic commitments through the constant improvement of cognitive skills.
Downloads
References
Adler, J. (1990). Conservatism and tacit confirmation. Mind, 99(396), 559-570. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/XCIX.396.559
Adler, J. (1996). An Overlooked Argument for Epistemic Conservatism. Analysis, 56, 80-84. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0003-2638.1996.00080.x
Chisholm, R. (1982). The Foundations of Knowing. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Christensen, D. (1994). Conservatism in Epistemology. Nous, 28, 69-89. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2215920
Christensen, D. (2007). Epistemology of Disagreement: the Good News. Philosophical Review, 116, 187-217. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2006-035
Coren, D. (2018). Epistemic conservatism and bare beliefs. Synthese, 198, 743–756. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-02059-8
Coren, D. (2019). Evaluating epistemic virtues. Synthese, 198, 1569–1578. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02144-6
Elga, A. (2007). Reflection and Disagreement. Nous, 41, 478–502. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00656.x
Foley, R. (1983). Epistemic Conservationism. Philosophical Studies, 165-182. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00372381
Foley, R. (1992). The epistemology of belief and the epistemology of degrees of belief. American Philosophical Quarterly, 29(2), 111-124.
Harman, G. (1986). Change in View: Principles of Reasoning. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Harman, G. (1999). Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/0198238029.001.0001
Kvanvig, J. (1989). Conservatism and its Virtues. Synthese, 79, 143-163. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00873259
Lycan, W. (2019). On evidence in philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198829720.001.0001
Lycan, W. G. (1985). Conservatism and the Data Base, en N. Rescher (Ed.), Reason and Rationality in Natural Science, Lanham: University Press of America.
Lycan, W. G. (1988). Judgement and Justification. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
McCain, K. (2008). The Virtues of Epistemic Conservatism. Synthese, 164, 185-200. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-007-9222-5
Sklar, L. (1975). Methodological conservatism. Philosophical Review, 84(3), 374-400. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2184118
Vahid, H. (2004). Varieties of Epistemic Conservatism. Synthese, 141, 97-122. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:SYNT.0000035849.62840.e8
Vogel, J. (1992). Sklar on methodological conservatism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 52(1), 125-131. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2107748
Williams, M. (2000). Dretske on epistemic entitlement. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60(3), 607-612. DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/2653818
Downloads
Published
Dimensions
Issue
Section
License
Copyright (c) 2024 Rodrigo Laera
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
Esta revista provee acceso libre inmediato a su contenido bajo el principio de hacer disponible gratuitamente la investigación al público. Todos los contenidos publicados en Claridades. Revista de Filosofía, están sujetos a la licencia Creative Commons Reconocimento-NoComercia-Compartirigual 4.0 cuyo texto completo puede consultar en <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0>
Es responsabilidad de los autores/as obtener los permisos necesarios de las imágenes que están sujetas a derechos de autor.
Los autores/as cuyas contribuciones sean aceptadas para su publicación en esta revista conservarán el derecho no exclusivo de utilizar sus
contribuciones con fines académicos, de investigación y educativos, incluyendo el auto-archivo o depósito en repositorios de acceso abierto de cualquier tipo.
La edición electrónica de esta revista esta editada por la Editorial de la Universidad de Málaga (UmaEditorial), siendo necesario citar la procedencia en cualquier reproducción parcial o total.
How to Cite
6.png)
